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arguendo. "[S]he left the place where she and her husband were
living . . . and again became a resident of Lincoln County...
No basis for this assumption was expressed.
Lynne Ward Rexroad

Estate Tax-The Marital Deduction and Powers of Appointment
The decedent devised property in trust to pay the income to
his wife and son for their lives with a power in the wife to consume
the corpus if necessary for their combined support and maintenance. The will provided for a remainder over after the death of
the wife and son. The estate took the devised property as a
marital deduction. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled
that the wife's interest was not a life estate with a power of
appointment that would qualify for the marital deduction. Held,
ruling affirmed.
The court held that the interest passing under the will did not
qualify for the marital deduction because the wife did not have a
power of appointment over a specific portion of the property and
the wife's power was not exercisable by her in all events. Even
if the wife had a life estate with a power of disposal as allowed
by West Virginia statute, her interest was something less than a
life estate with a power to appoint to herself or to her estate
and thus would not qualify for the marital deduction. Flesher v.
United States, 238 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
The marital deduction of the Federal Estate Tax law allows a
testator to devise up to 50%of his adjusted gross estate to a surviving spouse without incurring estate tax liability on that amount.
INr. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2056. One type of devise which will
qualify for the marital deduction is a gift of a life estate with a
general power of appointment to the surviving spouse. INT. R .
CODE or 1954, § 2056(b) (5). A marital deduction is allowed if
the surviving spouse's life estate contains the following features:
the surviving spouse must be entitled to the entire income from
her interest in the corpus for life; the income must be payable
annually or at more frequent intervals; the power must be exercised by the surviving spouse alone and in all events; the interest
cannot be subject to a power of appointment in anyone else but
the surviving spouse; and the surviving spouse must have the power
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to appoint the remainder to herself or to her estate. ITrr. R~v. COPE
oF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 16 (Michie 1961) authorizes the
creation of life interests in property coupled with powers of disposal. By the operation of this statute, the fee is prevented from
vesting in the life tenant and the remainder over is saved when
the life tenant is given the power in her lifetime or by will to
use or to dispose absolutely of the corpus of the estate. Price v.
Talkington, 126 W. Va. 263, 27 S.E.2d 705 (1943); Swan v. Pople,
118 W. Va. 538, 190 S.E. 902 (1937); 37 W. VA. L. Q. 422 (193031). In the Price case, a wife was given a life estate in property
with a power to consume the corpus as necessity might require.
There was a remainder over to others of any unconsumed property
remaining at the death of the life tenant. The court construed the
interest passing under the statute as a life estate with an appendant
power which, if exercised, would enlarge the interest of the life
tenant to a fee and destroy the vested interest of the remaindermen.
Prior to the enactment of this statute, a life estate coupled with
a power to consume or dispose of the corpus vested a fee simple
absolute in the life tenant, and the remainder over was destroyed.
Ogden v. Maxwell, 104 W. Va. 553, 140 S.E. 554 (1927); National
Sur. Co. v. jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291 (1924); Morgan
v. Morgan, 60 W. Va. 327, 55 S.E. 389 (1906); 36 W. VA. L. Q.
285 (1929-30).
The court in the principal case, by dictum, adopted the Price
case interpretation of W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 16 (Michie
1961) and indicated that, where a surviving spouse has only
a simple power to invade corpus, the interest passing to her under
this statute will not qualify for the marital deduction. The court
said that at most the wife received a life estate that could be
elevated to a fee simple at some future time by an act on her
part. The interest passing under this statute, the court stated,
was not sufficiently broad to encompass the requirement that the
surviving spouse have the power to appoint to herself or to her
estate.
Interpretations of the requirement of a power in the surviving
spouse to appoint to herself or to her estate have not been
uniform in instances where the surviving spouse has the unlimited
power to invade the corpus. According to the regulations, if all
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other requirements INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5) are met,
the interest of the surviving spouse will qualify for the marital
deduction if the surviving spouse has an unlimited power to
appoint to herself. TiS. REc. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1) (1965). If
she has this power, it is not necessary that she also have the power
to appoint to her estate. Tims. RE(. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1965).
A substantial number of cases are in according with these regulations. United States v. Spicer, 332 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1964);
Nettz v. Phillips, 202 F.Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1962); Carlson v.
Patterson, 190 F.Supp. 452 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Hoffman v. McGinnis, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960); Boyd v. Gray, 175 F.Supp.
452 (W.D. Ky. 1959). Because INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
2056(b) (5) uses the disjunctive "or," it is not necessary that the
surviving spouse have the power to appoint to herself and to her
estate. Nettz. v. Phillips, supra. Other cases, however, are contra
to the regulations and require that the surviving spouse have both
the power to appoint to herself and the power to appoint to her
estate before her interest will qualify for the marital deduction.
Field v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 802 (1963); Pipe v. Commissioner,
241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957). A
federal court in West Virginia would probably follow the rule
of the Nettz case, supra, and allow the marital deduction if it
found that the interest passing under W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1,
§ 16 (Michie 1961) allows the surviving spouse to appoint to herself absolutely or to her estate.
As previously indicated, the basic problem raised by the principal
case, is this: if a life tenant is given the power to dispose or to
consume the corpus absolutely, then under W. VA. CODE ch. 36,
art. 1, § 16 (Michie 1961), does this life tenant also have the
power to appoint the corpus to herself free from all other limitations? The language of the principal case indicates a negative
answer. In denying the marital deduction, the court implied that
the surviving spouse did not have the power to appoint to
herself absolutely. One authority maintains, contra to the principal
case, that a power to consume in the life tenant should enable the
life tenant to appoint to herself absolutely. Snm.s, FuTuRE INT=IESTS § 55 (1951). Admittedly, the distinction between the power
to appoint to one's self and the power to consume is quite fine,
but finer distinctions have been drawn in the technical field of
future interests.
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There is another reason, not discussed by the principal case,
which might distinguish an interest passing under the West Virginia
statute from other interests passing under like circumstances. After
first preserving the limitation over after the creation of any
interest in the first taker for life, W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 16
(Michie 1961) further provides that:
The proceeds of a disposal under such power shall be held
subject to the same limitations and the same power of use or
disposal as the original property, unless a contrary intent
shall appear from the conveyance or will.
Such a proviso may well be interpretated as a limitation which
will deny the marital deduction. What is a contrary intent is open
to question. This proviso of the statute has been criticised. 37
W. VA. L. Q. 422 (1930-31).
In Semmes v. Commissiorper, 32 T.C. 1218 (1959), a case involving a similar Tennessee statute, a surviving spouse was devised
a life estate with a power to consume the corpus with a remainder
over of any corpus unconsumed at the death of the life tenant.
TE.NN. CoDE. ANN. tit. 64, § 106 (Bobbs-Merrill 1955) authorized
this type of devise much the same as W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1,
§ 16 (Michie 1961). The effect of the Tennessee statute, as in
West Virginia, was to save the limitation over. The Tennessee
statute, however, made no provision for subjecting the proceeds
of any disposal to the same limitations that encumbered the original
property. In construing the Tennessee statute, the Tax Court
decided that a simple power to invade corpus did not permit the
surviving spouse to appoint the corpus to herself, her estate or
to others by gift. Therefore, the interest passing under this statute
did not qualify for the marital deduction. The Tennessee court,
in the Semmens case, stated that to qualify the surviving spouse's
interest for the marital deduction, she must have an express power
to appoint to herself or to her estate.
Thus, the question arises as to what language can be used in
a will to insure the martial deduction where a testator desires to
devise or to bequeath a gift of a life estate, coupled with powers
to dispose or to appoint, with a remainder over. It must be remembered that the surviving spouse must have, according to TREs.
REc. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1965), a power to appoint to herself
or to her estate. A devise to A for life, with a power to consume
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the corpus absolutely, remainder to B is dangerous because it appears that A does not have the power to appoint to herself. To
save the marital deduction, it appears that a greater estate in A
must be created, and it must be specifically stated that any proceeds from the disposal of the corpus are not to be subject to
the same limitations as the original property. Because W. VA.
CoDE ch. 36, art. 1, § 16 (Michie 1961) saves the remainder over
after any interest in property is created, it is possible to create a
qualified interest in A for life with a remainder over of any
unconsumed property after the death of A. 37 W. VA. L. Q., supra.
The following devise should, therefore, qualify an interest passing
under W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 16 (Michie 1961) for the
marital deduction: to A for life with the general power to appoint
to herself or to others by deed for any purpose, remainder to
others. All proceeds from the disposal of any property by A shall
be hers absolutely and not subject to any of the limitations imposed
on the original property.
Edward Garfield Atkins

Medical Practice--The Line Between Malpractice and Negligence
Plaintiff, P, instituted an action against D, a private hospital,
in connection with the alleged wrongful death of P's minor daughter. The child was admitted to the hospital with a serious heart
condition. Before leaving, the doctor advised the mother that if
the child should go into heart failure, she should have immediate
medical treatment. According to the mother, the child's condition
began to worsen shortly after the doctor left, at approximately
8:00 P.M., and the indication was she was suffering from progressive symtoms of heart failure. Between that time and midnight,
the child's mother pleaded frantically for aid from the nurses on
duty, but they virtually refused to even examine the child. As a
result, the doctor was not advised of the situation until approximately 12:30 A.M. He came quickly and administered emergency
treatment, but the child died the following evening. The trial
court refused to admit testimony of a New York physician concerning usual standards of care employed by nurses because he
neither lived in nor was familiar with the standards of care in
the immediate area. At the conclusion of P's testimony, the trial
court directed a verdict for D. Held, reversed, new trial granted.
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